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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
read with BCL § 102(a) (10), required that venue be laid in
the county designated by the plaintiff in its application for authority,
as the location of its office, regardless of the quantity or quality
of the contacts plaintiff had with that county.110
Under CPLR 503(c), a corporation is considered a resident
of the county in which its "principal office" is located. BCL§ 102(a) (10) states that the county in which such office is located
is that stated in the foreign corporation's application for authority.
However, in the BCL the term "principal office" is not used; the
section refers merely to the "office of the corporation."
This discrepancy has led to certain misconceptions as to what
factors control the venue in an action where the plaintiff is a
corporation. The frequently asserted contention that a corporate
plaintiff is at liberty to bring an action in the county where it is
a de facto resident, although its de jure residence is elsewhere,
appears to be conclusively refuted by the ruling in the instant
case.
Of greater significance, however, is that the ruling in this
case dispels the erroneous impression, conveyed by certain recent
opinions, that the office named in the application of authority or
certificate of incorporation must be a "principal office." "1 The
decision seems to effectuate the design of the drafters of the BCL
in that they have conspicuously omitted from section 102 the
qualifying terminology found in former Section 3(16) of the
General Corporation Law."12
ARTICLE 10 - PARTIEs GENERALLY
CPLR 1001(a): Motion to dismiss for nonjoinder of an
"indispensable" party.
In Blumenthal v. Allen,"'s a stockholder's derivative action,
defendant claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over the cor-
"1
0 Id. at 453, 257 N.Y.S2d at 122.
"'See Lande v. Deborah Hosp. (Sup. Ct N.Y. County), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
April 20, 1964, p. 17, col. 1; Shultz v. O'Connell (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
150 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 8, 1963, p. 14, col. 3.
12 Compare N.Y. GEx. CORp. LAW § 3(16): "The term 'office of a
corporation' means its principal office within the state, or principal place
of bwsiness within the state if it has no principal office therein." (Emphasis
added.), with N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 102(a) (10) : "'Office of the corporation'
means the office the location of which is stated in the certificate of in-
corporation of a domestic corporation or in the application of authority
of a foreign corporation . . . . Such office need not be a place where
business activities are conducted by such corporation."
"'346 Misc. 2d 688, 260 N.Y.S2d 363 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1965).
Coitra, Polar Distributors, Inc. v. Granger Realty Corp. (Sup. Ct Queens
County), 151 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 21, 1964, p. 20, col. 1.
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porate beneficiary, an indispensable party. Pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(10), a motion was made to dismiss the complaint upon
the ground that "the court should not proceed in the absence of a
person who should be a party." In ruling on the motion, the
court was faced with the question of whether the CPA's dual-
motion procedure was incorporated into the CPLR. Under prior
practice, 114 it was necessary to make two motions: first, to direct
the plaintiff to join the omitted party; and, second, if plaintiff
refused, to dismiss the complaint. 15
The court adopted the view put forth by the Biannual Survey
of New York Practice 24 that in light of CPLR 104, the former
dual-motion requirement was merely an unnecessary delay.
CPLR 1007: Vouching-in notice- third-party practice.
At common law a defendant having a third party liable over
to him could vouch him into the litigation, and, by giving him
proper notice of the suit, bind him by a final judgment 17 Vouching-
in, though still available, is seldom employed since CPLR 1007
provides a much easier method of impleading a third-party de-
fendant. However, vouching-in remains an integral part of our
procedural law since it can be employed to reach a third-party
defendant when the impleading party cannot meet the requirements
of CPLR 1007.118
Bouleris v. Cherry-Burrell Corp.'1 9 discusses some of the more
significant aspects of the vouching-in procedure. Bouleris involved
a proceeding on a motion to vacate a vouching-in notice prior
to a trial on the merits. In denying the motion to vacate, the
court held that the only ground upon which such a motion can
be granted, at that stage of the proceeding, is untimely notice' 20
The ruling in the instant case is based upon an examination
of the nature of notice procedures for vouching-in. The court found
that vouching-in is merely an invitation to a party, whom the de-
fendant considers to be liable over to him, to come in and defend.
If that.party defaults, the third-party defendant will be held liable
for any judgment that might be recovered against the third-party
14 RCP 102; CPA §§ 192-93.
115 E.g., Wolff v. Brontown Realty Corp., 281 App. Div. 752, 118 N.Y.S.2d
74 (2d Dep't 1953); Marsico v. Tramutolo, 135 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct.Queens County 1954).
118 38 ST. Jonn's L. Rzv. 447-48 (1964).
117 Note, 11 Btnr-Ai.o L. REv. 90 (1962).
118 For instance, if the defendant were a domiciliary of a foreign state
and not amenable to service under CPLR 301 or 302(a).
12945 Misc. Zt 318, 256 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
120 Id. at 319, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 538; see also Urback v. City of New York,
46 Misc. 2d 503, 259 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
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